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Analysis of the Liberian Ebola Survivors 
Support System (ESSS)
Abstract
A	 systems	 theoretical	 analysis	 to	 capture	 the	 evolution	 and	 transition	 of	 the	








System	 (ESSS).	 Secondly,	 this	 analysis	 acts	 as,	 a	 model	 of	 understanding	 how	
disease	 support	 networks	 first	 emerge	 and	 can	 be	 better	 supported	 in	 other	
outbreaks.
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Introduction 




uses	 a	 series	 of	 Diagrams	 that	 visually	 illustrate	 the	 various	
complex	 phases	 and	 their	 network	 changes	 that	 occurred	 and	
were	established	during	the	outbreak.	This	case	analysis	provides	
crucial	phase	information	that	both	captures	the	historical	events	
that	 informed	the	systems	changes,	 including	 the	development	
of	 the	 Ebola	 Survivors’	 Support	 System	 (ESSS),	 and	 secondly,	 a	




before	 documented.	 These	 new	 affected	 populations	 provide	
an	 often-unforeseen	 policy	 issue-	 tracking	 not	 only	 those	who	
become	 infected	 but	 disease	 survivor	 clusters	 to	 methodically	
respond	 to	 their	 unique	 support	 needs	 after	 their	 discharge.	
Systems	 theory	 literature	 offers	 solutions	 to	 this	 problem	 by	
analyzing	 already-existing	 networks	 that	 developed	 to	 respond	
to	 outbreak-affected	 populations.	 This	 literature	 further	
demonstrates	the	importance	of	mapping	the	process	by	which	
a	network	first	develops	and	changes	 in	 the	Complex	Adaptive	
System	 (CAS)	 of	 a	 crisis	 for	 future	 knowledge	 application.	 The	
2014/15	Ebola	Virus	Disease	(EVD)	outbreak	in	Liberia	acts	as	a	
vital	case	study	in	this	endeavour.
Amid	 the	West	African	Ebola	 response	CAS,	 the	 Liberian	 Ebola	
survivors’	 support	 system	 (ESSS)	 eventually	 grew	 from	 an	
emergent	field	of	action	into	a	legitimate	network	with	improved	
signals	 and	 boundaries	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 emergency.	
However,	this	learning	process	was	hindered	by	lack	of	previous	
knowledge	 to	 inform	 its	 formation.	 There	were	 previous	 Ebola	
outbreaks	but	with	little	knowledge	retention	or	guidance	for	key	
actors	 about	 providing	 care	 for	 persons	directly	 impacted	by	 a	
hemorrhagic	 disease.	 The	 Ebola	 response	 was	 ill-prepared	 for	
the	extent	of	survivors	whose	lives	were	left	in	pieces.	The	early	
stages	of	the	ESSS	may	be	characterized	as	delayed,	encumbered,	
and	 at	 times	 inefficient	 at	 the	 expense	 of	 helping	 those	most	
affected	by	 the	outbreak.	 The	 state	would	 later	 advocate	 for	 a	
mainstreamed	approach	placing	the	ESSS	as	a	leading	facilitator	
in	partnership	collaboration	among	fields.
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and	4),	 interviews	with	 various	 key	 representatives	of	 strategic	
action	fields	active	in	the	outbreak.	This	work	is	in	coordination	
with	 Government	 of	 Liberia	 (GoL),	 with	 appreciation	 for	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Gender	 Development	 and	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Health.	
These	two	ministries	have	had	multiple	official	titles,	but	for	this	
report	they	will	be	reference	by	simplified	titles.	Lastly,	ministry	
officials	 and	 external	 lead	 crisis	 responders	 later	 cross-verified	
the	 draft	 of	 this	 analysis,	 providing	 feedback	 on	 the	 accuracy	
of	 its	 information,	 findings,	 and	 conclusions.	 All	 feedback	 was	
included	in	the	modification	of	the	final	version.
Historical Documentation of Disease 
Survivors Support Systems
The	2014/15	Ebola	pandemic	resulted	in	28,616	cases,	of	which	
approximately	 one-third	 were	 in	 Liberia	 [1].	 Population	 data	





world,	mostly	 affecting	 sub-Saharan	 Africa	with	 a	 survival	 rate	
ranging	from	about	20-100%.	While	no	previous	outbreaks	had	
such	a	devastating	toll	as	the	2014/15	crisis,	numerous	incidences	
involved	 victims	 numbering	 in	 the	 hundreds	 [2].	 A	 2014	 study	
published	 in	 the	 Journal	of	 the	Royal	Society	 Interface,	“Global	
Rise	 in	Human	 Infectious	Disease	Outbreaks,”	 shows	 that	 since	




Most	 Ebola	 literature	 and	 response	 programming	 has	 mainly	
focused	on	disease	contract	tracing,	isolation,	as	well	as	treatment	
and	prevention	efforts.	Much	 less	exists	on	mapping	 the	network	
support	 for	 surviving	 victims	 of	 the	 virus.	 Other	 deadly	 diseases	
that	are	hemorrhagic	or	transmitted	through	bodily-fluids,	such	as	
Lassa	 fever	 and	HIV/AIDS,	 have	better	 research	 informing	how	 to	
systematically	respond	to	the	needs	of	survivors	or	their	households,	
in	 what	 may	 be	 considered	 a	 disease	 survivor	 support	 system	
(DSSS).	However,	this	research	developed	slowly	over	decades	after	




Phase Transitions - Fields and Interactions
Solé	 [6]	 demonstrates	 that	 phase	 transitions	 happen	 overtime	









[6].	 This	paper	will	 explore	 the	 change	of	 the	ESSS	 throughout	
these	phases.
Phase 1: Initial outbreak
The	 theory	 of	 systems	 by	 Fligstein	 and	 McAdam	 [7]	 provides	
insight	 into	 the	 social	 order	 that	 develops	 particularly	 in	 an	
emergent	 system.	 Furthermore,	 Fligstein	 and	McAdam	present	
a	 functional	 taxonomy	 for	 the	 different	 actors	 and	 fields	 in	
operation	in	analyzing	the	ESSS,	which	will	be	applied	frequently	
within	this	analysis,	including	in	the	phase	Diagrams.	Throughout	




response	 (March	 to	 early	 August	 2014)	 was	 obstructed	 by	 a	
large	diversity	of	 agents	 attempting	 to	 respond	 to	 the	 growing	
crisis	with	 little	 knowledge	or	 experience	 to	 guide	 them,	often	
operating	 independently	 with	 little	 collective	 action	 and	 weak	
information	sharing,	as	shown	in	Diagrams 1 and 1.1.
Actors
The	 Ministry	 of	 Health	 and	 Social	 Welfare	 (MOH),	 under	 the	
mandate	 of	 the	 Government	 of	 Liberia	 (GoL),	 played	 a	 crucial	
mediation	 and	 governance	 role	 which	 better	 stabilized	 the	
collective	 action	 of	 multiple	 survivor	 organizations,	 donors	
and	 response	 agencies	 operating	 in	 Liberia	 around	 the	 peak	
phase.	 Acting	 as	 internal	 governing	 unit	 (IGU)	 of	 multiple	
fields	 overseeing	 compliance	 for	 entities	 operating	 in	 country	
on	 tracking	 and	 prevention,	 treatment,	 and	 reintegration	 of	
affected	persons,	 the	MoH	along	with	 lead	partner	agencies	of	
the	 Incidence	Management	 System	 (IMS)	 enacted	policies	 that	
promoted	 the	 ESSS	 to	 become	 the	 strategic	 action	 field	 under	
which	 all	 coordination	 efforts	 were	 to	 occur	 to	 aid	 survivors.	
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national	and	 international	NGOs,	and	civil	service	organizations	
operating	 in	 country	 to	 support	 post-war	 reconstruction	 and	
peace-keeping	 efforts	 for	 over	 ten	 years	 found	 themselves	




ground	 instead	 acted	 as	 proximate	 fields	 resistant	 to	 adaption	
from	non-response	programming	to	emergency	response	action.	
They	tended	to	view	the	outbreak	as	beyond	their	scope	of	work	





one	 another	 often	 represented	 in	 power	 dynamics	 between	
actors	and	control	of	financial	resourcing.	Early	in	the	crisis,	the	
state	agencies	frequently	requested	funding	to	expand	response	
services	 and	 administration.	 But,	 the	 low	 number	 of	 disease	
incidents	 and	 redistribution	 of	 annual	 ministerial	 budgets	 to	
public	health	coffers	 temporarily	allowed	the	state	to	act	more	
autonomously	in	combating	Ebola.	For	a	time,	the	state	agencies	
were	not	 reliant	on	extensive	external	 funding	by	 international	




mostly	 went	 unnoticed,	 bleeding	 into	 the	 general	 emergency	
landscape.	 The	 first	 interactions	 with	 survivors	 infrequently	
occurred	 informally	 in	 person	 among	 key	 stakeholders:	 state	
ministry	 agencies	 (MOH	 Ministry	 of	 Gender	 (MOG)),	 national	
treatment	 response	 actors,	 and	 religious	 organizations,	 when	




of	 EVD	 infection,	 and	 both	 health	workers	 and	 public	 servants	
abandoning	their	posts	to	flee	the	crisis.	There	were	not	enough	




culture	 traditionally	was	hierarchical	with	 command	 structured	
centralized	in	ministry	departments,	which	as	Innes	Booher	[14]	
show	 involve	 bureaucratic	 styling	 that	 could	 hamper	 normal	
learning	processes.	Liberian	state	ministry	agency	communication	
systems,	often	too	outdated	for	timely	communication	required,	
were	 increasingly	 stretched	 thin.	Ministerial	 agencies	 relied	 on	
past	 methods	 of	 communication	 sharing	 through	 scheduled	
coordination	 meetings	 and	 formal	 printed	 letters/reports	
delivered	via	messenger	after	 rigorous	administrative	approval,	
including	 multiple	 signoffs	 from	 departmental	 heads	 in	 the	
central	ministry	and	County	Health	Team	(CHT)	requiring	hours	
if	 not	 days.	 Agents	 within	 the	 National	 Treatment	 Response	
shared	a	similar	culture	of	communication	as	they	comprised	of	
mainly	 nationals	 including	MOH	 staff.	 Yet	 foreign	 entities	 used	
electronic	 methods	 (phone,	 internet)	 that	 were	 more	 familiar	
and	frequently	circumvented	ministry	collaboration.
Information	 flows	 involving	 survivors	 occurred	 between	 fields	
later	in	the	first	phase	when	professional	actors	more	frequently	











to	 260	by	 late	 July)	 seeking	personal	meetings	with	 profession	
health	and	ministry	workers	 led	 to	 the	emergence	of	 the	ESSS,	
and	provided	signals	to	common	needs.
Transition of System Structure
The	 policy	 solution	 for	 the	 MOH	 was	 to	 authorize	 response	
organizations	 to	 hire	 survivors	 as	 temporary	 paid	 volunteers,	
working	mostly	in	Ebola	Treatments	Units	(ETUs)	and	quarantine	
centers	(ICCs/CCCs).	The	drivers	for	this	transition	were:	1)	unique	
human	 resource	 of	 persons	 who	 theoretically	 were	 immune	
to	 supplement	 care	 for	 contagious	 patients;	 2)	 motivation	 of	
affecting	 positive	 change	 in	 the	 face	 of	 tragedy	 [17,18].	 The	





plight	 was	 recognized	 and	 championed	 by	 key	 agencies,	 the	
ESSS	would	act	as	one	of	the	lynchpins	that	connected	different	
field	 agents	 under	 a	 shared	 common	 goal	 in	 the	 peak	 phase	
of	 emergency.	 Yet,	 the	 ESSS	 remained	 an	 emergent	 field	 with	
the	 only	 strong	 information	 flows	 occurring	 through	 standard	







throughout	 the	first	 phases	of	 the	 crisis,	 and	paper-based	 ETU	
registries	were	filled	with	incomplete	or	false	personal	identifiable	
information	 [19,20].	 Survivors	 learned	mostly	 through	word	 of	
mouth	through	small	pockets	of	survivor	support	networks	and	
associates	 from	ETU	discharge	 about	which	 officials	 to	 contact	
by	phone	or	visit	in	person	to	seek	help	[17].	Additionally,	public	
fear	of	survivors	was	amassing,	as	much	of	 the	population	was	
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held	traditional	voodoo	beliefs	of	diseases	being	a	spiritual	curse,	
which	 heightened	 stigma	 and	 discriminatory	 acts	 against	 this	
vulnerable	population	[16].
Phase 2: Peak
The	second	exogenous	shock	 in	 the	crisis	was	 the	August	2014	
rapid	spike	in	Ebola	rates,	led	to	strict	border	closures	and	media	









early	phase,	 the	peak	drove	 increased	 international	 support	as	
the	crisis	became	a	pandemic.
This	 shift	 drove	 a	 larger	 diversity	 of	 new	 response	 actors	 and	
spurred	 many	 older	 agents	 in	 proximate	 and	 distant	 fields	 of	
action	 to	 adapt	 their	 operations	 to	 join	 the	 response	 growing	
from	 a	 handful	 of	 active	 NGOs	 to	 at	 one	 time	 37	 response	
NGOs.	 Coordination	 between	 the	 national	 treatment	 response	
and	 regional	 coordinated	 response	 overlapped	 tighter	 through	
regional	policies	designed	by	international	agencies	and	donors	
in	 partnership	 with	 the	 West	 Africa	 contingency.	 However,	
the	 influx	 of	 new	 international	 health	 actors	 and	 transitioning	
nonprofits	 (NGOs)	 changed	 the	 power	 dynamic	 in	 terms	 of	
human	 and	 financial	 resourcing	 of	 the	 distant	 and	 proximate	
fields	(Diagram 2).	Feedback	loops	were	poorly	constructed,	an	
already	 inefficient	 information	 system	was	 further	 constrained,	
and	 most	 collaborative	 decisions	 and	 policies	 were	 rendered	
ineffective	[18].	As	Page	[9]	demonstrates,	too	much	diversity	in	




formation	 of	 a	 new	 system	 or	 revisions	 within	 it.	 Additionally,	
the	system	size	depends	on	the	number	of	different	actors	and	
how	they	adapt	to	work	better	together	as	a	continual	learning	
process.	 Slowly,	 the	 size	 and	 scope	 of	 the	 response	 CAS	 grew	
yet	individual	fields	increasingly	overlapped	in	effort,	unified	by	
improved	signals	and	boundaries,	with	the	ESSS	at	the	center	of	
this	 new	wave	 of	 energy	 serving	 as	 a	 policy	 tool	 for	 improved	
collaborative	action.	However,	conflict	and	competition	amongst	
the	different	 response	fields	 injected	divergence	 in	 the	ESSS	as	
the	crisis	grew.
In	August	 as	 the	disease	 climbed	 to	over	 1,300	 cases,	 the	 IMS	
Committee	 Deputy	 Minister	 proposed	 to	 the	 MoH/IMS	 the	
formation	 of	 the	 NESNL,	 which	 would	 be	 internally	 overseen	
and	maintained	 by	MoH/IMS	 representatives	 and	managed	 by	








together	 for	 solidarity	 and	 support,	 and	 eventually	 gained	
some	financial	funding	from	different	agencies	such	as	religious	
organizations,	individual	sponsors,	civil	society	organizations,	and	
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and	agency	activities	to	combat	the	disease,	but	also	in	working	
with	EVD	survivors	and	vulnerable	families.	As	shown	in	Diagram 
2.1,	 communication	 chains	 changed	 and	 grew	 more	 complex,	
often	 deviating	 from	 older	 response	 channels.	 Although	 the	
IMS	 and	 the	 Ebola	 Emergency	 311	Hotline	were	 in	 place,	 they	
were	 relatively	new	 systems	not	 experienced	 in	 country.	Many	
Peak	Phase	actions	recommended	by	external	partners	 like	the	
CDC/WHO	 and	 sanctioned	 by	 the	 state	were	 strange	 concepts	
to	 Liberian	 citizens	 requiring	 great	 adjustment,	 such	 as	 calling	
for	an	ambulance	or	burial	team	to	tend	to	victims.	Some	were	




incoming	 response	agencies,	but	ministry	 leadership	 continued	
further	 collaboration.	 Maintaining	 cooperation	 becomes	







6	 which	 were	 unregistered	 with	 the	 state	 [10].	 Each	 cluster	
(Diagram 2.1)	 was	 actively	 tracking	 survivors	 for	 membership,	
soliciting	organizations	and	donors	for	portions	of	the	increased	
funds	 and	 resources,	 and	 representing	members’	 issues	 in	 key	
response	 coordination	 meetings.	 The	 MOH	 grew	 weary	 of	 its	
inability	to	track	actions	between	survivors	and	external	partners.	
The	quality	 of	 information	 tracking	worsened	 as	 these	 clusters	
reported	duplicate	membership	and	used	different	tracking	and	
reporting	systems.





form	 of	 fraud	 during	 the	 outbreak.	 Likewise,	 donors,	 eager	 to	
allocate	their	funds,	and	implementers,	under	pressure	to	spend	
grants	quickly,	frequently	communicated	with	the	ESSS	through	





Transition of System Structure
By	 October	 2014,	 the	 driver	 of	 change	 in	 the	 next	 phase	
transition	of	the	ESSS	included:	1)	controlling	financial	allocations	
and	 resource	 distribution,	 and	 2)	 improved	 communication	




transitioned	 into	 strategic	 action	 fields	 supporting	 survivors.	
While	 these	 policies	 were	 often	 state	 imposed,	 they	 allowed	
what	Innes	and	Booher	[14]	refer	to	as	collaborative	rationality.
Firstly,	 in	 October	 2014,	 all	 clusters	 or	 groups	 working	 with	
survivors	had	 to	 register	with	 the	 state	and	 submit	 all	 reports,	
partnership	 agreements	 and	 membership	 lists	 or	 identified	
survivor	 databases	 to	 the	 newly	 formed,	 joint	 MOH/MOG	
division,	associated	with	the	 IMS.	Secondly,	the	state	 in	 its	role	
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facilitated	the	first	national	meeting	of	all	identified	survivors	in	
Monrovia	on	contact	lists.	In	this	large	meeting	with	attendance	
in	 the	hundreds,	survivors	were	asked	to	 formally	 register	with	




(ESA)	 and	 the	 MOH-supported	 National	 Ebola	 Survivors’	




as	 well	 as	 resources	 including	 computers	 and	 phones.	 With	
the	NESNL	housed	 in	 the	MOH,	dialogue	with	 state	authorities	
facilitated	 engagement	 and	 consensus	 for	 action,	 and	 served	
as	a	direct	communication	tool	that	quickened	decision-making	
approval	 among	 key	 departments	 also	 set	 up	 in	 the	 main	
building.	 The	 state	 also	 disbanded	 several	 fraudulent	 groups	
posing	 as	 clusters.	 Additionally,	 another	 key	 policy	 stated	 that	
all	 implementing	 agencies	 had	 to	 undergo	 state-led	 training	
of	 protocol	 in	 working	 with	 vulnerable	 populations	 including	
survivors	and	children	[22].
The	 increased	 frequency	 of	 interactions	 with	 actors	 and	 the	









their	 voices	 became	 a	 universal	 symbol	 of	 overcoming	 Ebola	
in	 distant	 fields;	 their	 testimonials	 were	 shared	 nationally	 and	
internationally	through	social	media	and	news	outlets,	promoted	
by	 international	 actors	 in	 all	 fields	 including	 UN	 agencies	 like	
UNICEF	 and	 the	 I	 Survived	 Ebola	 campaign,	 donors	 like	USAID,	
as	well	as	 INGOs	like	Save	the	Children	and	More	than	Me.	Yet	





These	qualitative	changes	 in	 the	Peak	Phase	 in	 communication	
and	information	exchange	helped	solidify	consensus	for	change	
in	 a	 more	 democratic	 and	 systematic	 fashion.	 Secondly,	 it	
reestablished	 the	 ministry	 agencies	 not	 only	 as	 IGU	 but	 in	 its	
traditional	cultural	role	as	managing	authority,	which	was	needed	
to	 create	 improved	 field	 stability	 through	 setting	 signals	 and	
boundaries	reflected	through	protocol	and	policies	that	oriented	
old	and	new	agencies	 (Diagram 2.2).	Set	policies	provided	tags	
for	 competing	 fields,	 particularly	 donors	 and	 international	
health	organizations/transitioned	response	NGOs,	of	acceptable	
boundaries	 for	 actions	 involving	 survivors,	 and	 revised	 a	 new	
shared	 culture	 amongst	 actors.	 For	 instance,	 the	 MOH	 began	
regulating	the	range	for	one-time	relief	stipends	and	salary	pay	for	














instance,	 a	 project	manager	may	need	 to	 have	Memorandums	
of	 Understanding	 (MoUs)	 signed	 with	 multiple	 departments	
in	multiple	 state	ministries,	which	was	not	conducive	 to	timely	
action	 in	 an	 every-changing	 emergency	 response	 cas.	 This	was	








the	 next	 phases	 of	 the	 emergency.	 Survivor	 clusters	were	 also	
identified	later	as	still	existing	without	proper	registration,	often	
soliciting	 funding	 that	 could	 not	 be	 accounted	 for	 officially.	
Moreover,	competition	continued	to	grow	amongst	the	clusters	
for	funding	for	their	members	and	their	priority	of	needs,	as	well	





By	December	 2014,	 this	 ongoing	 gap	 in	 collaboration	between	





Religious	Organizations * *** ***
National	Health	Treatment	Response * *** ***
Implementers-Transitioning	INGOs	and	Health	INGOs - ** ***
Donors - * ***
Communication	about	ESSS-	Low*;	Medium**;	High***;	State	Agency	Adherence-	Strong	(Green);	Weak	(Yellow);	Contentious	(Red)
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Team	 the	need	 to	 impose	a	more	authoritative	 transition.	 This	
move	 was	 further	 advertised	 to	 entities	 through	 a	 series	 of	
actions	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 Phase	 2.	 Primarily,	 the	 November	





Phase	 3,	 the	 decline	 of	 the	 outbreak,	 experienced	 a	 shift	 in	
the	 system	 fields.	 International	 donors	 and	 agencies	 fields	
transitioned	 into	 large	 strategic	 fields	 that	 eventually	 outsized	
both	 the	 fields	 of	 the	 state	 ministry	 agencies	 and	 national	
treatment	 response.	 However,	 these	 four	 SAFs	 overlapped	 in	
their	 coordination	mainly	 through	 formal	meetings	 established	
through	 the	 IMS	 and	 coordinated	 email	 groups,	 co-led	 by	 the	
GoL	agencies,	the	US	military,	key	UN	agencies,	and	international	
response	agencies.	The	number	of	meetings	drastically	increased	
as	 too	 did	 the	 number	 of	 agencies.	 Other	 additional	meetings	
were	established	by	proximate	fields	of	operations	with	national	
and	international	operators,	including	by	UN	agencies	like	UNICEF.	
These	 meetings	 had	 selective	 membership,	 such	 as	 between	
mostly	 international	 agencies	 coordination	 and	 few	 ministry	
representatives,	 often	 relating	 to	 niches	 of	 relief	 work	 efforts,	
such	as	the	management	of	ETUs,	CCCs,	or	health	infrastructure.	
Divisions	 in	UNMIL	 increasingly	 joined	 supporting	 Ebola,	 but	 it	
remained	 mostly	 a	 distant	 field	 when	 it	 came	 to	 supporting	
Ebola	survivors.	The	regional	coordinated	response	 increasingly	
overlapped	 as	 a	 proximate	 field	 with	 the	 main	 Liberian	 SAFs,	
resulting	 from	Liberia’s	early	peak	phase.	 Lastly,	 the	ESSS	grew	
in	size	and	resourcing,	while	remaining	strategically	within	close	
coordination	with	the	state	ministry	agencies,	yet	at	the	center	
of	 where	many	 SAFs	 and	 proximate	 fields	 overlapped	 through	
coordination	meetings.	Thus,	the	visibility	of	the	ESSS	advanced.
Key Issues
International	 funding	 support	 for	 the	 crisis	 reached	 into	 the	
billions	of	dollars.	This	pledge	of	aid	helped	shape	a	quickened	
recovery;	 however,	 EVD	 rates	 had	 fallen	 significantly,	 most	 in	
part	 to	 the	 learning	 and	 leadership	 of	 the	 original	 field	 actors	
operating	 on	 the	 ground	 since	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 outbreak.	
Most	particularly,	under	the	command	of	the	Executive,	the	MOH	
and	MOG	 joint	effort	provided	 rational	 and	 legitimate	decision	
making	for	state	 implementers,	however	depleting	government	
coffers.	In	Phase	3	(January-May	2015),	the	state	became	heavily	
reliant	 on	 external	 sponsors	 for	 funding	 support,	 to	 build	 new	
quarantine	centers,	 fund	ETUs,	hire	new	staff	and	back-pay	old	
staff	who	had	repeatedly	worked	without	salary.
Innes	 and	 Booher	 [14]	 demonstrate	 how	 sponsors	 are	 crucial	
for	 legitimacy,	which	provided	a	new	challenge	to	 the	state	 for	
maintaining	 its	 leadership.	The	MOH	and	MOG	opened	new	or	
more	frequent	dialogue	through	a	series	of	continuous	meetings	
with	 key	 donor	 agencies,	 like	 USAID-DART/OFDA,	 EU,	 and	
the	 African	 Development	 Bank	 (ADB),	 for	 improved	 collective	
action.	Donors	double-checked	that	 their	 funded	 implementers	
frequently	 attended	 coordination	meetings,	 as	well	 as	 have	 all	
MOUs	approved	by	MOH	and	CHT	leadership	as	part	of	auditing	
procedure	[20].	Other	similar	examples	of	collaboration	happened	
at	 top	 decision	making	 levels	 and	were	 enforced	 onto	 ground	
operations.	 Work	 efforts	 and	 funding	 streams	 further	 aligned	










Vol. 1 No. 2: 10
Integrative Journal of Global Health 
9© Under License of Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License 
Transition of System Structure
Firstly,	the	NESNL	became	the	umbrella	body	of	all	the	survivors.	
The	 state	 informed	 the	 other	 clusters	 like	 the	 ESA	 that	 they	





authorization	 was	 sent	 from	 the	 President	 to	 legitimize	 this	
decision	 by	 the	 MOH-MOG.	 Small	 pockets	 of	 unauthorized	
operations	continued	for	a	time,	but	eventually	the	government	
halted	 them.	Monthly	 ESSS	meetings	 transitioned	 into	 NESNL-
facilitated	meetings	where	its	membership	continued	to	increase	
beyond	its	original	1,500	members,	and	finalized	a	registry	of	over	
5,000	 identified	 survivors	 by	 May	 2015	 [19,20].	 Furthermore,	




The	 central	 NESNL	 became	 permanently	 housed	 in	 the	 MOH	
and	 closely	 collaborated	 with	 MOH-MOG	 authorities,	 including	
providing	update	reports	daily	and	provided	ongoing	space	to	share	
key	 information	 on	 behalf	 of	 survivors	with	 all	 actors	 in	 the	 IMS	
and	Response	Pillar	meetings.	All	 communications	were	 funneled	





Secondly,	 the	 social	 media	 and	 news	 campaigns	 championing	
the	stories	of	survivors	dominated	most	outlets,	and	positioned	
funding	 support	 for	 the	 ESSS	 as	 one	of	 the	 key	 priorities	 for	 a	
few	brief	months	in	the	third	phase.	The	state	ministry	agencies	







Combat	Ebola	 in	Liberia	 (ACCEL),	and	UNICEF	to	establish	 large	
scale	 programs	 with	 systematized	 operations	 for	 all	 registered	
survivor	members	 and	 their	 families	 to	 benefit	 from,	 including	









the	 future	 NESNL.	 The	 purpose	 was	 to	 help	 democratically	






non-food	 items	 (NFI)	 kits,	 vocational	 training,	 health	 and	 mental	
services,	volunteer	stipend	pay,	etc.
As	a	 result,	 the	central	NESNL	management	 rose	 from	4	key	staff	
to	 the	 formal	election	of	7	 stable	central	positions	housed	within	
the	MOH,	and	66	delegates	 in	11	counties.	The	building	blocks	of	
other	MOH-supported	networks	were	 repurposed	 for	 the	NESNL,	
 
Diagram 3.1 Main	Field	Information	Flow	and	Survivors.
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including	 legal	 policies	 and	 MOUs,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 establishment	




As	 the	 third	 phase	 came	 to	 a	 close	 towards	 recovery	 efforts,	 the	
repurposing	 of	 the	 NESNL	 as	 the	 singular	 representative	 body	
moved	 the	 ESSS	 away	 from	 micro-perspectives	 that	 insularly	
considered	the	short-term	needs	of	the	survivors	and	transitioned	
the	ESSS	to	expand	its	vision	for	a	coordinated,	unified	effort	in	the	




a	 union-like	 agency	 for	 survivors	 and	 their	 families,	 receiving	 and	












what	 is	 just	 and	what	 is	 not,	 as	well	 as	 by	 the	 relative	 power	
of	 those	 actors	 and	 the	 collective	 choices	 that	 result.	 It	 is	 the	
joint	 product	 of	 all	 relevant	 actors	 combined”	 [12].	 Over	 the	
course	of	the	crisis	in	Liberia,	it	primarily	fell	upon	central	state	
ministry	agencies	to	formally	coordinate	and	set	policies	for	the	
ESSS	 to	 respond	more	 systematically	 to	 the	 increasing	need	of	
survivors	and	affected	households.	The	state	agencies	 faced	an	
ever-changing	response	CAS	with	a	variety	of	actors,	flocculating	
communication	 chains,	 and	 resource	 and	 funding	 partnership	
compliance	issues.	However,	over	the	course	of	16	months,	the	
priorities	 of	 survivors	who	were	disproportionately	 affected	by	
the	crisis	took	precedence	amongst	the	multitude	of	actors	who	
joined	efforts	with	MOH/IMS	guidance.	Because	of	this,	the	ESSS	
gradually	 transitioned	 into	 a	 legitimate	network,	 authorized	by	
the	state	as	the	official	body	or	union	for	EVD-affected	persons,	
under	the	leadership	of	the	NESNL.
The	 NESNL	 functioned	 as	 the	 umbrella	 organization	 that	 clusters	
came	under	while	still	maintaining	some	autonomy	as	decentralized	
groups	so	long	as	they	reported	directly	to	the	NESNL	and	complied	
with	 its	 mandates.	 Secondly,	 they	 had	 to	 report	 all	 identified	
survivors	 to	 the	 IMS	 survivor	 registry	 and	 at-risk	 disease-affected	
households,	particularly	vulnerable	children,	to	the	Division	of	Child	




sharing,	 partnership	 coordination,	 and	 collective	 action	 in	 an	
equitable	manner	impacting	more	survivors.
In	 Liberia,	 this	 emerging	 system	 is	 effective	 in	 its	 capacity	
beyond	the	short-term	and	mid-term	goals	of	the	response	and	
recovery,	 but	 may	 yield	 sustainable	 action	 in	 the	 government	
policy	 to	 continue	 to	 support	EVD	 survivors	 for	 years	 to	 come.	
The	NESNL	 continues	 to	 operate	 as	 a	 formal	 organization	with	
leadership	 staffed	 by	 the	 state.	 Budget	 constraints	 continually	
plague	the	NESNL	efforts	to	meet	with	survivors	in	decentralized	
and	 centralized	 meetings.	 They	 currently	 utilize	 social	 media	
and	 news	 to	 transmit	 key	 messages	 to	 members	 and	 their	
families.	The	NESNL	will	need	to	rely	on	outside	donor	support	




to	 train	 through	 knowledge	 sharing	 forming	 survivor	 support	
systems	that	were	not	as	advanced.	NESNL	 leaders	continue	to	
conduct	trainings	and	advocate	for	survivors	internationally.	Yet,	
the	 slow	maturation	of	 the	 Liberian	ESSS	 serves	 as	 a	 reminder	
of	what	could	have	been	achieved	had	previously	documented	
systems	 informed	 its	 emergence.	 The	 question	 remains	 if	 the	
ESSS	could	have	transitioned	between	phases	more	quickly	and	
systematically	 with	 previous	 knowledge	 application	 from	 prior	
outbreaks?
Informing future disease survivor support systems
An	established	DSSS	body,	such	as	the	Ebola	Survivors’	Network,	
can	serve	multiple	purposes.	Examining	the	ESSS	development,	





agencies	 most	 likely	 to	 interact	 with	 survivors	 should	
allocate	 immediate	 funding	 and	 human	 resourcing	 for	
the	establishment	of	a	formal	body	to	track	and	organize	
survivors.	This	action	may	 include	several	parts:	 forming	
primary	 leadership;	 a	 basic	 IMS	 system	 with	 track	 and	
registry	 tools	 for	 the	 initial	 DSSS	 linked	 to	 communities	
and	ETUs/quarantine	centers;	clear	assigned	IGU	roles	of	
specified	ministerial	departments	to	guide	and	coordinate	









distribution	 amongst	 identified	and	 registered	 survivors,	
as	in	the	case	of	the	NESNL.
• Eventually,	 the	 DSSS	 (like	 the	 NESNL)	 may	 select	 to	
transition	 into	 a	 lead	 representative	 body	 that	 provides	
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term	recovery	and	reintegration,	and	consults	on	annual	
prioritization	 of	 requested	 resources	 and	 programs,	
as	 the	 needs	 of	 survivors	 change	 over	 time.	 This	
transition	should	consider	how	leadership	at	central	and	
decentralized	 levels	are	selected,	such	as	through	voting	
or	 merit-based	 hire	 by	 government	 agencies,	 as	 well	
as	 the	 leadership’s	 individual	 roles	 and	 responsibilities,	
reporting	mechanisms,	administration	and	budgeting,	and	
communication	 patterns	with	 disease	 survivors,	 donors,	
and	implementing	agencies.
• Advocating	 for	 both	 state	 and	 international	 donors	 to	
allocate	annual	funding	for	cost-efficient	DSSS	operations	
within	 their	 budgets	 can	 sustain	 progress	 support	 over	
time.	 This	 paper	 advocates	 for	 this	 prioritization	 of	
continued	funding	for	the	NESNL	by	GoL	and	international	
agencies,	 including	 USAID	 and	 WHO/CDC.	 The	 NESNL	
serves	not	only	the	5,000	identified	survivors,	but	it	may	
also	 facilitate	 guiding	 support	 for	 the	 estimated	 25,000	
direct	 and	 indirect	 affected	 households	 in	 Liberian	
communities	that	were	former	hot	zones.
• Additional	 funding	 for	NESNL	 and	 future	DSSS	networks	
can	 support	 regional	 partnerships	 between	 countries	
affected	by	the	outbreak	as	it	transitions	into	a	pandemic,	
linking	network	cells	together	for	knowledge	sharing	and	
transnational	 coordination.	 These	 DSSS	 transnational	
partnerships	including	collaboration	between	the	Liberian	
NESNL	 and	 emergent	 ESSS	 networks	 in	 Guinea	 and	
Sierra	 Leone	 should	be	maintained	 for	 two	 reasons:	 the	
likelihood	 of	 the	 disease	 reemerging	 is	 high	 following	
current	disease	trends;	and	secondly,	the	negative	impacts	
of	 diseases	 like	 Ebola	 on	 affected	 persons	 and	 their	
households	 continue	 long	 beyond	 the	 outbreak	 ends.	
Stigma,	 income,	 and	 physical	 and	 mental	 health	 issues	
[16,19,25,26].	 Regionally,	 there	 remain	 at	 least	 10,000	
survivors	and	their	affected	households	and	communities.
• As	 a	 contingency	 plan,	 the	 ESSS	 leadership	 may	 act	
as	 consultations	 on	 the	 startup	 of	 a	 DSSS	 in	 the	 case	
of	 outbreaks	 involving	 new	 strains	 of	 EVD	 or	 other	
communicable	diseases.	This	role	may	include	site	travel	
but	only	on	a	voluntary	basis	and	under	strict	protection	






and	 survivors	 of	 the	 disease.	 National	 and	 international	






disaster	 response	 situations.	 The	 foundational	 concepts	
of	the	work	outlined	in	this	manuscript	can	be	applicable	









By	 retaining	 core	 knowledge	 and	 training	 through	 the	
NESNL	leadership,	and	careful	documentation	of	the	ESSS	
Diagram 4 DSSS	Structure.
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ministerial	 agencies.	 The	 ESSS	 offers	 a	 roadmap	 for	 an	








establishment	 and	 leads	 management	 of	 the	 ESSS	 throughout	
its	 infancy	 into	 its	current	role	at	time	of	developing	this	work.	
His	 first-hand	 knowledge	 and	 recount	 of	 the	 ESSS	 formation	
serves	as	 a	body	 for	 this	 analysis.	 The	other	 author	worked	as	
an	international	technical	adviser	to	the	ESSS	throughout	Phases	
2-3,	 and	 at	 different	 times	 worked	 as	 a	 consultant	 with	 some	
of	 the	 first	 programs	 utilizing	 Ebola	 survivors	 in	 ICCs,	 as	 well	
as	 programs	 providing	 psychosocial	 support	 to	 survivors,	 their	
families,	and	communities.	Disaster	responses	provide	challenges	
to	 capturing	 timely,	 accurate	 data,	 as	 primary	 focus	 goes	 to	
targeting	and	isolating	the	outbreak.	Archival	documents	were	a	
challenging	to	find	as	there	were	limited	knowledge	management	
systems	 in	 place	 during	 Phases	 1-3.	 The	 authors	 specifically	




This	 research	 recognizes	 that	 there	 are	 limitations	 in	 the	
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